

次の英文は Alison Gopnik による *The Philosophical Baby* (2009年) に基づいている。これを読んで以下の設問に答えなさい。

(I) に入るもっとも適切な語を下から選び、記号で答えなさい。

(A) agreement (B) consternation (C) judgment (D) speculation

(II) 下線部(2)を日本語に訳しなさい。

(III) 下線部(3)を日本語に訳しなさい。

(IV) 下線部(4) that understanding が示す内容を30字以内の日本語で説明しなさい。

(V) に入るもっとも適切な句を下から選び、記号で答えなさい。

(ア) as if (イ) especially when (ウ) even though (エ) in order that

(VI) 下線部(6)を日本語に訳しなさい。

(VII) 下線部(7) the same thing が示す内容を以下から選び、記号で答えなさい。

(a) Crossing the street alone is dangerous.

(b) Learning to lie is part of growing up.

(c) Peeking in a closed box is deceptive.

(d) Young children get under one's skin.

(VIII) 子どもの発達にとって “imaginary companions” を持つことはどのような効果があると著者は考えているか、100字以上120字以内の日本語で説明しなさい。

(IX) 次の日本語を英語に訳しなさい。

人間が自分の都合を優先してしまいがちだという事実は、否定のしようがない。

Imaginary companions are a common and fascinating phenomenon of childhood and they've inspired a lot of psychological (1). But, surprisingly, until recently no one had actually studied them systematically. The psychologist Marjorie Taylor decided to remedy this (she was inspired by her own daughter, who spent much of her childhood being Amber the Dog, and later became an actress in Hollywood). In her work we meet the likes of Nutsy and Nutsy, the raucous but charming brightly colored birds who live in a tree outside a little girl's window, and whose incessant talking sometimes amuses and sometimes irritates her; and Margarine, the little girl with floor-length golden braids who not only explains the exigencies of playgroup to the three-year-old who created her, but later helps the boy's little sister to make the transition to preschool. But Taylor showed that imaginary companions are surprisingly common.

Taylor asked randomly chosen three- and four-year-old children and their parents a set of specific questions about imaginary companions. Most of the children, 63 percent to be exact, described a vivid, often somewhat bizarre, imaginary creature. Taylor repeated the questions on several occasions and found that the individual children were quite consistent in their descriptions of their imaginary companions. ⁽²⁾ Moreover, their descriptions matched the independent descriptions of their parents. This showed that the children really were describing their imaginary friends, not just making them up on the spur of the moment to please the interviewer.

Rather depressingly, little boys seem to have a penchant for becoming supercreatures of enormous power, while little girls are more likely to invent small animals to pity and take care of. My own three sons showed both patterns: Galaxy Man, the scary superhero alter ego of my oldest son, and Dr. Termanson, the egg-headed, slightly comic, slightly sinister mad-scientist companion of my second, were later joined by the very small and needy Twins who lived in my youngest son's pocket.

At least a few children seem to keep their imaginary companions privately long after they have given them up publicly. Frida Kahlo* painted her imaginary childhood friend in her self-portraits, and Kurt Cobain* addressed his suicide note to his imaginary friend, Bodha (admittedly these examples might seem to support parental anxieties about weirdness). Imaginary friends can also sometimes be passed from sibling to sibling. Usually, though, they eventually fade from the children's minds with hardly

a trace.

As with pretend play in general, ⁽³⁾the vividness of imaginary companions, and especially the vividness of the emotions they generate, led psychologists in the past to conclude that they indicated children's shaky grasp of reality. Freudians* have typically seen imaginary companions as indicators of some sort of therapeutic need—a sign of neuroticism that demands treatment. Imaginary companions play a similarly psychoanalytic role in popular culture, both in scary movies like *The Shining* and sentimental ones like *Harvey*.

But imaginary companions are not, in fact, an indication of either genius or madness. Children with imaginary companions are not, on the whole, markedly brighter or more creative or shyer or crazier than other children. Imaginary companions aren't the result of distress or trauma, and they aren't precursors of pathology. Some children do seem to use their companions to help sort out problems in their lives, but for most they seemed to be just plain fun.

When children grow older, imaginary companions are usually replaced by a new kind of imaginary activity. "Paracosms" are imaginary societies rather than imaginary people. They are invented universes with distinctive languages, geography, and history. The Brontës* invented several paracosms when they were children, as did the teenage murderers who inspired the movie *Heavenly Creatures* (one of them, in real life, grew up to be the novelist Anne Perry).

Using her interview technique, Taylor found that many perfectly ordinary, unliterary, unmurderous ten-year-olds also created their own paracosms, just as most ordinary four-year-olds created imaginary companions. One child, for example, created a planet called Rho Ticris inhabited by gigantic hounds called dune dogs, the Blue (blue-skinned humanoids), and the Dire Grim, a sinister race with seven rows of teeth. Rho Ticris was an important part of his life from nine until twelve, when it faded away as the earlier imaginary companions do. And, of course, many of the favorite books and games of older children—from the *Harry Potter* and *Narnia* books to *Dungeons & Dragons* and *Warcraft*—also involve paracosms. Paracosms are probably less familiar than imaginary companions partly because they are less common and partly because they are more private and less likely to be communicated to adults.

Why do young children create imaginary companions? The imaginary companions reflect ways that people might be, and ways they might act. The heyday of imaginary companions is between about two and six years old. It turns out that this is also the period when children create an everyday psychology—a causal theory of the mind. From two to six, children discover fundamental facts about how their own minds and the minds of others work. They formulate a causal map of the mind. They start to understand the causal connections between desires and beliefs, emotions and actions, just as they start to understand the connections between food and growth or illness. One of the central tenets of this theory of mind is that people may have different beliefs, perceptions, emotions, and desires and that those differences may lead to different actions. People behave differently because they have different kinds of minds.

Even babies who can't talk yet already seem to understand something about the ways that people might differ, and they can make new and surprising causal predictions based on ⁽⁴⁾ that understanding. For example, we showed fourteen-month-olds and eighteen-month-olds two bowls of food—broccoli and Goldfish crackers*. All the babies, as you'd expect, loved the crackers and couldn't stand the broccoli. Then the experimenter tasted a bit of food from each bowl. She acted (5) she were disgusted by the crackers and happy about the broccoli. She said, "Eew, yuck—crackers" and "Mmm, yum—broccoli," revealing that her tastes were the opposite of theirs. Then she put out her hand and said, "Can you give me some?"

The babies were a bit startled by the experimenter's perverse tastes—they waited awhile before they did anything. Nevertheless, the fourteen-month-olds gave the experimenter the crackers. But although the eighteen-month-olds had never seen anyone crazy enough to reject Goldfish crackers, they made the right prediction. ⁽⁶⁾ They sweetly did what they thought would make the experimenter happy, however weird it might seem to them. Just as they immediately knew to use a rake to get the toy, even though they'd never done it before, they immediately knew to give the experimenter the broccoli instead of the crackers. Once you know how rakes and toys work, you can do something new to make a distant toy move. Once you know how people's tastes work, you can do something new to make them happy.

Just as children construct a causal map of biology that relates growth

and illness, life and death, they also construct a map that connects mental states to one another and to the world outside them. And with that map in hand they can explore all the possible combinations and permutations of human behavior, and imagine all the strange things that people might think, feel, and do. Oscar the Grouch on *Sesame Street* plays on this ability. Once young children know the general principle, that Oscar likes all the things that we don't, they can, delightedly, predict that Oscar will love trash, smelly food, and worms but hate puppies and chocolate or that he'll be happy if you give him dirt but not if you give him flowers.

As we might also expect, those causal maps allow children to act to change the minds of others. If I know that Anne has a particular passion for broccoli, I'll know that I can bribe her with broccoli to do what I want, or tease her by withholding broccoli, or make her like me by presenting her with a steaming green platter of the stuff—all techniques that will be worse than useless if she really only likes crackers. I'll know, too, that if I want her to get me some crackers from the cupboard, I'd better make sure she knows they're in there; just asking won't help if she hasn't seen them. But if I want to keep her from getting the crackers, I can lie and tell her that the cupboard is empty.

Children who can explain actions in terms of a theory of mind also seem to be more adept, for good or ill, at altering other people's minds. Children who better understand minds are more socially skillful than those who do not, but they are also better liars. They're more sympathetic but they're better at getting under your skin too. As any successful politician knows, understanding how people work can help you to make them happy—or to manipulate them for your own ends. Four-year-olds can be surprisingly crafty politicians, especially with parents as their constituents.

Lying is a particularly vivid example of the advantages of understanding how minds work. As Machiavelli* himself could have told you, lying is one of the most effective forms of Machiavellian intelligence. Our human ability to deceive others, both our allies and our enemies, is a great advantage in managing our complex social lives. Very young children may lie, but they're not very good at it. My younger sister once shouted to my mother, "I didn't cross the street by myself!"—from the other side of the street. When they play hide-and-seek, very small children will notoriously put their heads under a table with their behinds sticking very visibly into view.

You can see ⁽⁷⁾ the same thing in experiments. In one study the experimenter showed children a closed box and then told them there was a toy inside, and not to peek at it. Then the experimenter left the room. For children curiosity is the greatest drive of all, and very few of them could resist the temptation. When the experimenter returned she asked if they had peeked in the box, and what was inside it. Even the three-year-olds denied that they had peeked inside the box. But then they immediately told the experimenter what was in there! Only at five or so could children deceive in an effective way.

Marjorie Taylor discovered that children with imaginary companions tend to have a more advanced theory of mind than other children, even though they're no smarter overall. Children who had imaginary friends were better at predicting how other people would think, feel, or act than those who did not. Similarly, contrary to popular legend, sociable children were actually more likely to have imaginary companions than shy and lonely children. There's no getting around the fact that, from the adult point of view, there's something spooky about imaginary friends. But in fact, as far as children go, they're not only commonplace, they're a sign of social competence. Having an imaginary friend isn't a replacement for real friends, and it's not a form of therapy. The children with imaginary companions really care about people and like to think about them even when they're not there.

*Frida Kahlo (1907–54): A Mexican painter well known for her portraits and self-portraits.

*Kurt Cobain (1967–94): The guitarist and frontman of the influential rock band Nirvana.

*Freudians: Followers of Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), the founder of psychoanalysis, who elaborated a theory of the unconscious.

*The Brontës: Charlotte (1816–55), Emily (1818–48) and Anne Brontë (1820–49), famous sisters who wrote novels and poetry.

*Goldfish crackers: Fish-shaped cheese crackers popular among American children.

*Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527): An infamous Italian philosopher, whose political thought has legitimized the use of dishonesty by politicians.